Germany thrashed Argentina 4-0 in a match that saw Argentina chasing the game from the 2nd minute, when Müller opened the scoring for the Germans.

The one-sided scoreline, as well as the utter inability of the Argentines to create clear chances throughout the match, underscore the tactical inadequacies of the Argentine side, who had been untested up to this point in the World Cup.

The main culprit: Maradona, of course. Having called up the ridiculous amount of players (over 100) in the 2 years before this tournament, he failed to create any semblance of a solid midfield to support his stellar forwards.

Indeed, the increasingly washed-out Maxi Rodríguez has been quite disappointing for the past 2 or 3 years. Let go by Atlético, where he had long ago lost his place in the team, he moved to Liverpool, where he again failed to show any compelling reason to be in the first team this season. Once a pacy winger, he showed many of the signs of a player once reliant on his speed; now, he certainly is past his physical peak and struggling to find a new identity as a player. Nothing showing in this match.

In Mascherano, Argentina had a battler, albeit one known to lose his head increasingly in frustration. At Liverpool, he is well regarded by the fans and teammates, but showed his limited depth in the past two seasons, lacking any constructive vision beyond his break-up play, and often getting his team in trouble by mouthing off to refs and making foolish challenges.

Against Germany, the trio of Messi-Higuaín-Tévez, brilliant as it is, was completely isolated. As early as the 20th minute, we say Messi tracking back to left back just to get a touch on the ball. There was zero supply and zero possession from the Argentine midfield, and the result was resorting to alienated long-balls and individual actions by the forwards. And it fell more than flat against a disciplined German defense.

Even in its weak moments, the lack of support from midfield damaged any Argentine hopes of scoring.

Maradona’s team was without ideas, without help in the middle, where the Germans completely dominated via Schweinsteiger, Khedira, and Müller. This made the job of the outstanding Boateng even easier, snuffing out Argentina’s left side on attack, and Friedrich had little to do at right back.

In the end, it was a game for players like European champion Inter Milan’s Esteban Cambiasso, a holding midfielder capable of constructing the flow of the game, inexplicably overlooked by a stubborn, caricaturized Maradona. Nor was there any room on this team for the ageless Javier Zanetti, outstanding this season for Inter, as experienced a right back as any, and also an accomplished attacker. Not even a consideration for Gago, the young Real Madrid midfielder who showed tremendous growth this season, finally beginning to fulfill his potential. And not a mention for Ever Banega, the Valencia creative midfielder who had an excellent season in Spain.

Instead, Maradona preferred to focus on picking a seemingly random bunch of players, including the over-the-hill Juan Sebastián Verón and Martín Palermo, and showed faith in some very inconsistent, shaky defenders such as Demechelis and the erratic Heinze.

In addition, he focused on his own clownish antics more than that on tactics. Let’s face it: Argentina’s 2010 campaign was less about the players and more about Maradona giving cameras a clear view of his about-to-burst suit trousers, celebrating every goal like it was the last in Argentina’s cup (little did he know). By failing to step back and recognize his team’s weaknesses, and delving deeply into his incorrigeable ego, it was ultimately the team that was hurt.

The 4-0 should, at the very least, go a long way in showing Argentina the mistakes made in their World Cup campaign, beginning with the appointment of a man not fit to be the manager of a serious national team.

The most telling anecdote: Maradona furiously refused to sit down at a press conference after a friendly match with Germany in January, upon seeing Müller seated at the press table. He angrily declared that Germany had sent this “ballboy” to insult him. Now the ballboy has given him the ultimate response on the field in Cape Town.

Dunga handed in his resignation immediately following the 2-1 loss to the Netherlands, citing that the blame was “his and everybody else’s”

To some extent, he was right. If, by “everybody else,” he meant Felipe Melo. And to a lesser extent, Julio César, trumped as one of the best keepers in the World Cup despite not having to do anything in the whole tournament, and failing the one time it mattered.

1. Melo’s case is more clear-cut as a reason for this shocking loss: his pass created the 1-0 as the Dutch defense failed to show up; his incisive pass, which a good defense would never have allowed, gave Robinho a cakewalk for the opening goal.

However, a long ball into the box in the second half showed a tactically unaware Melo, who impeded his own keeper (who probably should have called him off anyways) and headed into his own net. The worst was yet to come. When Brazil were down 2-1, his stupid and deplorable stomp on Arjen Robben deprived Brazil of an even handed contest.

Obviously frustrated, Melo had been the victim of numerous fouls, which brings me to a second point:

2. The Japanese referee, Yuichi Nishimura, was inconsistent in controlling the match. Moments before being sent off, Melo received a particularly brutal hack from behind from Mark Van Bommel. Amazingly, Van Bommel was fouling with virtual impunity throughout the second half, and in my neutral eyes could have gotten at least 3 clear-cut yellow cards.

It was a mystery to those watching that, for example, Michel Bastos would receive a yellow for persistent fouling, yet Van Bommel, fouling even more flagrantly and frequently, escaped booking.

Of course, none of these are excuses for Felipe Melo’s temper-tantrum and dirty kick. This side of Melo was obvious against Portugal, though in that case Dunga subbed him off before he could do himself (or an unfortunate Portuguese player) more damage.

3. This brings us to the third key in this self-destruction of the Brazilian team: Dunga. It is simple to see that in this specific match, he was all wrong in his changes; he really should have seen Felipe Melo, already visibly frustrated, off when they were drawing 1-1. Taking off Michel Bastos gave the Dutch loads of space to exploit on that side of the field, freeing them from his incursions down their own right channel.

Secondly, taking off Luis Fabiano and introducing Nilmar did not make much sense when they were 2-1 down. A forward-for-forward swap only makes sense when you are winning or drawing a very tight game in which a forward is seriously not functioning.

This last swap demonstrates one of Dunga’s biggest mistakes in the end: a lack of attacking and creative depth in the squad.

With the 1-0, Brazil did not dominate as they should have; their team was set up to play against a team that would attack them in the manner of Chile. In contrast with Spain, who held a masterclass of how to play with a 1-0 against Portugal, they were unable to keep meaningful possession. Unlike Argentina, who when winning 1-0 against Mexico went for the jugular, they lacked ideas and incisiveness when leading.

When tied 1-1, even more when they were losing, there was no go-to player that could come in and make an impact. This lack of an impact sub drastically limited the tactical options of the Brazilians. The conservative double-holding formation anchored by Melo and Gilberto Silva makes sense in a tight match in which limiting the opponents options takes precedence over creating chances.  Counterattacking is essential in such a system.

But when Brazil were desperately needing a goal, they had to take more risks, and simply did not have the resources to create them. Robinho and Kaká were exposed in a poor performance from both of them; by the time Holland scored, their defense showed itself to be more than apt in 1-on-1 situations, man marking tightly and pressuring the creators every time they had a touch. As a result, there were no options for either of them, and Luis Fabiano received no supply whatsoever all game.

At this point, Dunga’s great flaw of not calling up more attacking players is glaringly obvious. There was much controversy in Brazil at the repeated omission of players such as Juventus’s Diego, a brilliant midfield orchestrator; Alexandre Pato, who was injured until late April, yet still is a brilliant and irrepresible forward; and the old dog Ronaldinho, whose experience and vision might have changed things for Brazil.

And this is still overlooking attackers such as Hulk, who has been absolutely outstanding for Porto in the last couple edition of the Champions’ League.

For a time, these failings on Dunga’s part were overlooked. The world, and Brazilian fans, seemed ready to overlook the increasingly distant ideals of jogo bonito (which the British press, no doubt swayed by Nike, have perverted to Joga Bonito) in favor of a physical, low-risk battling squad.

In the end, the abandonment of jogo bonito was more than risky: it was disastrous. Dunga, and Brazil’s, negation of their stereotypically skillfull and swashbuckling game was a practical and tactical error too large to overcome against a rather fortunate Dutch side.